

degree of thoroughness that is rarely found elsewhere. No man is, therefore, in a better position to write on the subject of human sterility.

As a clinician he has approached his subject from a practical point of view, and has in turn dealt with the causation, the diagnosis and the treatment of infertility in both sexes. Since satisfactory treatment can only be based on a correct diagnosis of the pathology of sterility, a great deal of space has been given to the tabulation of the causes of childlessness. Dr. Meaker lays particular emphasis on the frequency with which an endocrine disorder is discovered in such cases. Every clinician who has had to investigate the fertility of males must have been struck by the comparatively common discovery that the semen of an apparently healthy male contains no spermatozoa. When there exists no mechanical obstruction in the genital tract, azoospermia is due to aspermatogenesis. The commonest explanation of this failure of an apparently healthy testis to form spermatozoa is some form of pituitary dysfunction. The investigation of the pituitary, therefore, takes a very important place in the examination of an infertile patient. It is unfortunate that biochemical methods are of such little assistance in the diagnosis of pituitary disorders, and still more unfortunate that so little progress has been made in the therapy of the pituitary gland. Some readers will feel that Dr. Meaker overrates the value of pituitary preparations when taken by the mouth. The majority of those who have tried different forms of extract have found them of little value as stimulators of spermatogenic activity, although the author claims many cases in which fertility, both in the male and in the female, has been materially increased thereby. But, as is stated in the foreword, the endocrinological material contained in the book represents one school of thought in a new and rapidly developing field where there is room for some differences of interpretation. The fact that the experience of some other workers has not been so happy as that of Dr. Meaker in no way detracts from the value of his book.

From the point of view of the eugenicist, there is little in this book that has a direct bearing on his subject. The eugenicist is not disturbed by the total incidence of sterility in the race, but rather by the inadequate reproduction of superior families. The factors that produce sterility are found with almost equal frequency amongst the better and the less satisfactory members of the race, so that they exert but little influence on race degeneration or improvement. Nevertheless, since a deficient diet, a poor level of general health and a high incidence of venereal disease are important causes of infertility, the excellent survey of the subject provided by the writer cannot fail to be of some interest to the student of eugenics.

KENNETH WALKER.

FREUDIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Stephen, Karin, M.A., M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P. *Psycho-analysis and Medicine: The Wish to Fall Ill.* Cambridge, 1933. The University Press. Pp. 238. Price 8s. 6d.

DR. ERNEST JONES, in his preface, leads us to expect a very good book, and this book certainly deserves his praise. Dr. Karin Stephen applies the term "psycho-analysis" to the findings and technique of the Freudian school—a restriction of its use which saves confusion, and is in accordance with the report made by the British Medical Association on the subject in 1929. Her aim, in which she has admirably succeeded, is to give a brief survey of psycho-analysis to doctors or other people intelligently interested in the subject.

As is natural in a young and growing science, there are—as Dr. Stephen makes evident—divergences of opinion about new work that is being done; but the greater part of her book is devoted to the body of knowledge accepted by all psycho-analysts. The first chapter deals with the fact of psychogenic illness and the necessity for a psychological approach to it. The author considers that psycho-analysis gives a working hypothesis for such an approach and that

Freud opened the way to an understanding of pathological conditions having a psychological origin. He discovered for one thing that neurotic troubles have both a meaning and a use. "Neurosis arises when some powerful impulse is thwarted, not simply by absence of what it craves in the outside world, but rather on account of internal conflict with some other powerful impulse." The example used by Dr. Stephen to illustrate her meaning might, I feel, have been of a more common event than the one she has chosen. She cites the possibility of a baby nearly suffocating while drinking at the mother's breast. After such an experience the sight of the breast will arouse anxiety as well as hunger, which means that fear will now conflict with the primary impulse of appetite. One difficulty for the small child is that its instinctual urges "may be strong out of all proportion to its capacity for getting what it wants, so that rage and fear come powerfully into conflict with desire, and instinct repression may seem to be the only possible solution."

Dr. Stephen would have done well to have stressed, even more than she has, the sense in which psycho-analysts use the word repression. She does tell us that it means "banning a thing from consciousness"; but, "unconscious" mental functioning being one of the most difficult psycho-analytical concepts to the person untrained in psycho-analysis, she might perhaps have emphasized the fact that she uses the word throughout in its technical sense—namely, to mean a process by which an impulse is put beyond recall by the ordinary mechanisms of conscious memory. This, she tells us, is the use of repression: it saves the individual from an unbearable memory or impulse, but it means that a part of him is dissociated and loses touch with real life. Unfortunately, the repressed impulse is not dead, but still dynamic and, if the forces of repression are not strong enough, finds outlet in symptoms; when repression does not fail, the result appears in inhibitions of the individual's capacity, both for enjoyment and work. The symptom represents in part, therefore, an impulse which once was pleasurable and so corresponds to a desire, which fact gives Dr.

Stephen her subtitle, *The Wish to Fall Ill*.

On this theory the neuroses are due to a conflict and, as Dr. Stephen points out, people who say that "Freud puts everything down to sex . . . have failed to grasp the real point," which is that psychogenic illness is the result of a "deadlock which arises out of the conflict between infantile sexuality and fear or aggression or rage." One difficulty in the way of understanding psychogenic illness, she goes on to explain, lies just here, for it is a "fixation" of a part of the personality to an immature level of development. She deals admirably with the much disputed question of infantile sexuality as it is understood by psycho-analysts, making clear the fact that biological functions such as eating and excreting have a certain sense-pleasure attached to them, which is greater in some functions than in others. Where the "sense-pleasure" is great, the organs concerned become pleasure zones, and what Freud discovered was that all "sense-pleasure," from whatever part of the body it arises, "is a manifestation of a single instinct," which is the sex instinct. He also discovered that there is a continuous development of this instinct from birth onwards. Dr. Stephen describes the various stages of this development, and her chapter on the "oral stage" seems to me the best in the book. She has coined an excellent expression, "mouth thinking"—a process which does not end abruptly with the sucking stage of development, our need for food and the importance of the mouth in love and ordinary intercourse making this impossible.

In dealing both with the excretory and phallic stages of infantile development the author does not, we feel, sufficiently prepare the reader for psycho-analytical findings, though what she has to say about them is well put. Among other things, she points out how a permanent fear of loss of control, which brings with it a loss of spontaneity and enjoyment, arises from fears regarding loss of sphincter control in the nursery. Very good too is what she says about "pleasure zones" becoming "displeasure zones," with a resulting entanglement of love and hate in the adult's emotional life, and sometimes an

inability to love at all. Dr. Stephen invents one of her happy phrases here: she speaks of "the sexuality in which love has been infected by hostility," quoting Oscar Wilde's line: "For each man kills the thing he loves," as a clear-sighted statement of how terrible a thing "ambivalence" may be.

Students of Freud will recall how he makes the way in which the phenomenon of transference is treated in the technique of therapy one of the touchstones to whether psycho-analysis is being used or not. Dr. Stephen, in her chapter on treatment, makes it clear why a sure understanding of the transference is so necessary, and points out further what a colossal task the psycho-analyst sets himself. How far what she says is convincing will depend on the mind of the reader, partly of course on the transference—whether positive or negative—which he makes to the book; for I should not agree with the inference, which might possibly be made from this chapter, that transference is to be looked upon as purely pathological, though it has this aspect in psychogenic illness. It seems to me as normal to our civilization as is repression, the advantages of which are dealt with in the first chapter.

People unconvinced by Dr. Stephen's arguments will find that this book gives them something of the feeling of a nightmare; and this, if the hypothesis it stands for is correct, is inevitable, for the feeling of nightmare is engendered by the fear that just such impulses as those here described will come to consciousness. Other readers will see the immense hope which this tabooed knowledge gives us for the future; for, as Dr. Stephen says, it should enable us to recognize the early signs of maladjustment in children and thus to avoid a great deal of neurosis for the coming generation. I. F. GRANT DUFF.

PHILOSOPHY

Schiller, Prof. F. C. S. *Must Philosophers Disagree? And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.* London, 1934. Macmillan & Co. Ltd. Pp. 359. Price 12s. 6d.

PROFESSOR SCHILLER has always had a high

and refreshing scorn for philosophy in the accepted sense, and particularly for the professional philosopher. The present volume is avowedly "popular," but a pragmatist can perhaps afford to be "popular" better than most philosophers. The essays and papers which compose the book spread over a considerable area of space and time in respect of the place and date of their delivery (the bulk of them are papers read to learned societies or lectures delivered to—generally—American audiences) and range from a highly diverting account of the methods (and morals) of examiners in the "Greats" School at Oxford to the presidential address to the Society for Psychical Research delivered in 1914.

To the eugenicist the most important element in the book will be the stress which Professor Schiller's brand of philosophy, perhaps alone among philosophies as such, enables him to lay on practical questions of race degeneration and improvement. Indeed, a humanist philosophy, one would expect, should necessarily concentrate on eugenics, though it is arguable whether from the time of Protagoras to our own Professor Schiller is not the first to realize the importance of this.

To the philosopher his treatment of novelty is undoubtedly the most valuable, and not least perhaps because it contains a line of thought and argument that will appeal to and can be made use of by philosophical speculation which does not necessarily share the pragmatist preoccupation with the personal element, and does not accept the pragmatist's definition of truth. As for that, one who is not a pragmatist might be inclined to suggest that the most valuable and important sections of the book tacitly imply a conception of "absolute" truth which theoretically can find no place in Professor Schiller's philosophy.

The *raison d'être* of philosophy, it has sometimes been suggested, is to co-ordinate the sciences and cover the ground they leave untouched. Really this reverses the position. It is not so much that the scientist discovers the real and the philosopher fits the pieces together (or even less that the philosopher